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Abstract
Since the Uruguay Round, African countries have been concerned about the rules and operations of the 
multilateral trading system and are beginning to realize that they have to be active in the negotiation 
process to protect their interests. Consequently, several countries in the region have been relatively more 
active in the Doha Round negotiations and have formed alliances with other developing countries to 
increase their bargaining power. Th is paper provides a critical assessment of Africa’s concerns in the 
negotiations on agriculture and the Doha Round. It also examines the extent to which the Hong 
Kong Ministerial declaration meets the demands of African countries in the agriculture negotiations. 
Furthermore, it outlines essential elements of any new agreements on agriculture that would ensure a 
fair outcome for the region. Finally, the paper stresses that trade is important for development in Africa 
but is not the solution to the numerous economic and social problems facing the region. Consequently, 
African countries must adopt a strategic approach to trade which ensures that their participation in the 
Doha Round reforms does not jeopardize the achievement of key national development goals.
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1I. Introduction
Up until the Seattle Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, African 
countries were relatively passive participants in the trade negotiation process. Since the Seattle Meeting, 
countries in the region have been showing more interest in international trade negotiations. Th is new 
interest stems largely from two sources. Th e ﬁ rst is the growing realization that trade has a vital role to 
play in the economic development of the region. Th ere is also the understanding that the extremely 
inward-looking development strategy adopted by several countries in the 1970s and 1980s discouraged 
trade and foreign direct investment and had deleterious eﬀ ects on growth and living conditions in the 
region (Rodrik 1998; Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006a). Th e second reason for the new interest in trade 
negotiations is the recognition that globalization is now an inevitable feature of the world economy and 
that countries have to participate in the process if they are to protect their interests, minimize any potential 
risks, and maximize gains. Consequently, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, the key trade policy question 
or controversy in the region is no longer whether or not countries should participate in multilateral trade 
reforms. Rather it is how to participate as well as mechanisms or complementary policies that are needed 
to ensure that participation does not jeopardize important development goals in the region. 
As a result of Africa’s enhanced interest in trade negotiations and the human and ﬁ nancial resources 
countries are devoting to them, the region is relatively more organized in the negotiations now compared 
to the situation during the Uruguay Round and have also made progress in arriving at common African 
positions on some of the key issues under the Doha Development Agenda. Th e Africa Group (AG) in 
Geneva has played a key role in this area. Th e AG is an informal group of Geneva-based African trade 
negotiators established at the end of the Uruguay Round to enable African countries pool their limited 
human resources together and protect their common interests in multilateral trade negotiations. Th e 
formation of the AG has increased the bargaining power of African countries in the negotiations and 
made it possible for countries in the region to discuss and speak with one voice on issues of importance 
to them. Th e group under the leadership of the African Union has also been quite eﬀ ective in forming 
alliances to protect Africa’s interests in speciﬁ c aspects of the negotiations. For example, during the 
Fifth and Sixth WTO Ministerial Conferences in Cancun and Hong Kong respectively, AG formed 
an alliance with the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) group and the African, Caribbean and Paciﬁ c 
(ACP) countries in what is now popularly known as the G-90. As a result of this new alliance, developing 
countries successfully opposed the launching of negotiations on the Singapore Issues during the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference. 
Th is paper takes a critical look at Africa’s concerns in the WTO negotiations on agriculture and the Doha 
round. It also examines the extent to which the region’s demands were met by the commitments made in 
the draft declaration issued at the end of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong. Finally, 
2it outlines essential elements of any new trade agreements that would ensure a fair outcome for Africa in 
the agriculture negotiations.
Th e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a critical evaluation of reasons for Africa’s 
reservations about trade reforms. Section III explains why the agriculture negotiations are important for 
Africa. Section IV outlines Africa’s concerns in the Doha Round and the multilateral trading system. 
Section V focuses on what Africa wants from the agriculture negotiations. Section VI outlines how to 
ensure a fair outcome for Africa in the agriculture negotiations. Th e last section contains concluding 
remarks.
3II. Understanding Africa’s reservations about trade reforms
Several African countries rely on trade taxes for government revenue and are concerned that trade 
liberalization would erode the ﬁ scal base with potential negative consequences for the provision of 
infrastructure and social programmes. Table 1 presents information on the number of countries in the 
region for which trade taxes represent a given percentage of total revenue. 
Table 1: Dependence on trade taxes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Trade tax revenue (as percentage of 
total revenue )
Number of Countries 
1985-1994 2000-2003
0-10.9 5 7
11-20.9 11 8
21-30.9 5 10
31-40.9 11 10
41-50.9 7 7
51-100 3 2
Total 42 44
Source: Computed using data from African Development Indicators 2005.
As is obvious from the table, over the period 1985-1994, taxes on international trade and transactions 
represented more than 20 percent of total revenue in twenty-six of the forty-two countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for which there is data. Although more recently there has been a decrease in dependence on trade 
taxes in some countries there has also been an increase in others. Consequently trade taxes still account 
for a signiﬁ cant percentage of total revenue in several countries.  For example, over the period 2000-
2003, trade taxes represented more than ﬁ fty percent of total revenue in Comoros, Gambia, and Niger. 
In countries such as Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Uganda the ﬁ gure was 
more than 40 percent over the same period. More detailed information can be found in the appendix.
In the public ﬁ nance literature it is typically argued that the revenue consequences of trade reform are 
likely to be small in the early stages of liberalization. Th e idea is that the early stage of trade reform 
involves tariﬃ  cation of quotas and reduction of prohibitively high tariﬀ s which are likely to raise imports 
and hence revenue. While it is generally acknowledged that the second stage of reform might lead to a 
reduction in trade tax revenue, the general argument is that developing countries should not worry about 
this as they can recover the lost revenue by switching from trade to domestic taxes (Ebrill, Stotsky, and 
4Gropp 1999). Th is assumes that institutions are eﬃ  cient and that governments can administer the tax 
system eﬀ ectively thereby mobilizing substantial amounts of revenue to compensate for the revenue loss 
due to liberalization. Emran and Stiglitz (2005) present a theoretical model showing that liberalization 
may lead to a reduction in government revenue. Th e idea is that in developing economies with large 
informal sectors, tax evasion and avoidance are pervasive and these have implications for the ability of 
governments to derive signiﬁ cant revenue from domestic taxes. Furthermore, Khattry and Rao (2002) 
provide econometric evidence indicating that trade liberalization had substantial ﬁ scal costs in low and 
upper middle-income countries. New empirical evidence also suggests that poor countries that switched 
from trade to domestic taxes did not recover the lost revenue from liberalization (Baunsgaard and Keen 
2005). While these ﬁ ndings do not imply that countries dependent on trade taxes should not embark 
on trade reforms, they do suggest that the ﬁ scal implications of trade liberalization should be taken into 
account in multilateral trade negotiations.
African countries are also concerned that liberalization may increase macroeconomic volatility with 
potential consequences for output and poverty reduction eﬀ orts. Th e idea being that liberalization may 
increase terms of trade volatility and hence output volatility. Th is is particularly an issue for African 
countries because they export a relatively few number of products and so are more vulnerable to terms 
of trade shocks. Although this view is widespread, it is very diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd strong empirical evidence 
that supports it. If one looks at output volatility in the region during the period 1986-90 compared 
to volatility in the period 1996-2000 when the region had relatively more open economies, it is very 
diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd any clear relationship between trade liberalization and output volatility. Table 2 presents 
data on output volatility and average unweighted tariﬀ s in African countries for the periods 1986-90 and 
1996-2000. 
Table 2: Output volatility and average tariﬀ s in Africa (1986-2000)
1986-1990  1996-2000
Country Volatility Tariff  Country Volatility Tariff
Swaziland 13.7 - Guinea-Bissau 18.4 24.4
Gabon 12.1 - Sierra Leone 10.3 18.3
Mozambique 6.3 15.6** Rwanda 7.6 21.4
Ethiopia 6.1 29.6 *** Lesotho 5.8 13.6
Cameroon 5.7 32.0** Morocco 5.7 33.1
Mali 5.7 - Zimbabwe 5.5 22.3
Sierra Leone 5.3 30.9 Togo 4.9 15.0
Morocco 4.9 23.4 Gabon 4.7 20.1
Burkina Faso 4.5 60.8** Congo, Rep. 4.3 16.2
Botswana 4.4 - Ethiopia 4.3 25.5
Nigeria 4.2 29.7 Mozambique 4.1 15.5
Cote d’Ivoire 4.2 26.1 Cote d’Ivoire 3.7 18.5
51986-1990  1996-2000
Country Volatility Tariff  Country Volatility Tariff
Tunisia 4.1 26.0 Zambia 3.1 14.0
Lesotho 3.9 - Burkina Faso 2.8 25.4
Congo, Rep. 3.9 32.0* Comoros 2.3 33.4
Guinea-Bissau 3.7 - Malawi 2.0 18.9
Comoros 3.0 - Uganda 1.8 10.9
Rwanda 3.0 33.0** Algeria 1.5 24.9
Zimbabwe 3.0 9.2 Mali 1.5 15.2
Zambia 2.9 29.9** Kenya 1.4 17.1
Mauritania 2.9 22.3 Gambia 1.4 13.2
Togo 2.7 - South Africa 1.4 7.9
Uganda 2.6 25.0 Nigeria 1.3 24.1
Senegal 2.6 13.5 Botswana 1.1 -
Malawi 2.2 18.0 Madagascar 1.0 6.6
Algeria 2.2 24.6 Mauritania 0.9 15.9
South Africa 1.7 15.2 Tunisia 0.8 30.9
Egypt 1.5 39.7 Mauritius 0.7 25.6
Mauritius 1.5 36.3 Swaziland 0.4 14.0
Gambia 1.1 - Egypt 0.4 26.2
Madagascar 1.1 6.0 Ghana 0.3 14.6
Kenya 1.0 40.3 Senegal 0.3 19.3
Ghana 0.7 18.8  Cameroon 0.3 18.5
Notes: * refers to data for 1986; ** refers to 1987 and; *** refers to 1988.
Two points can be made from this table:
• Relative to the 1986-90 period, a number of countries had a reduction of trade barriers in 1996-
2000 but also experienced an increase in volatility. Sierra Leone, Kenya, Rwanda, and the Republic 
of Congo are in this category.
• Th ere are also several countries that had a reduction in trade barriers as well as a decrease in output 
volatility. See for example, Mauritius, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Uganda, South Africa, and 
Egypt.
Clearly, the data suggests that the impact of liberalization on output volatility diﬀ ers across countries. 
Th is is consistent with recent econometric evidence on the issue. For example, Dupasquier and Osakwe 
(2006b) examined the relationship between trade regimes and macroeconomic volatility using econometric 
techniques and found no evidence of any systematic relationship between the two variables. Th e study 
found that factors such as the volatility of inﬂ ation, climatic disasters, terms-of-trade volatility, the nature 
of ﬁ scal policy, and the severity of debt are more robust determinants of macroeconomic volatility in the 
region.
6Another major issue of concern to African countries is how to deal with the costs of adjustment to trade 
reforms. Th ere is some understanding amongst economists that reforms may have long-term beneﬁ ts 
(McCalla 2001). However, it is also generally acknowledged that they have short-term costs. Th ese costs 
arise from the fact that reforms require reallocation of factors of production from protected sectors to 
areas where a country is more competitive in production. Th is reallocation of factors may lead to the 
displacement of workers as well as output losses in the short run. Given the fact that this issue is of 
concern to several countries in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, it is surprising that 
not much research has been done on estimating the costs of adjusting to trade reforms in developing 
countries. Most existing studies focus on reform in advanced countries and the general conclusion is that 
the costs are small in relation to the beneﬁ ts of reform (Anderson 2004; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 
2001; Matusz and Tarr 1999). Of the few studies that have been conducted for developing countries 
the evidence is mixed, although several studies conclude that in the presence of rigid labour markets the 
gains from trade liberalization are often less than the adjustment costs (Laird and Fernandez de Cordoba 
2005). For African countries, the existence of adjustment costs is of concern because they often have 
relatively rigid labour markets and no social safety nets. Davidson and Matusz (2000) have shown that in 
economies with rigid labour markets, the costs of adjustment to trade reforms might oﬀ set the beneﬁ ts.
7III. Why the agriculture negotiations are important for Africa
African countries have a predominantly large rural population with agriculture accounting for a high 
proportion of employment. Th erefore the agricultural sector plays a critical role in the development 
of African economies. In this regard, improved market access for Africa’s agricultural exports through 
multilateral trade liberalization would have important consequences for economies in the region. In 
contrast, in developed countries as well as Latin American and Caribbean very few people make their 
living through agriculture. In the United States and Canada, for example, in 2000 the share of agriculture 
in total employment was roughly 2 percent. In the European Union it was about 4 percent and in Latin 
America and the Caribbean it was 20 percent. Th is contrasts with 66 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
56 percent for Asia (Table 3). 
Table 3: Share of agriculture in employment (%)
Region/Group 1970 2000
Africa 76 58
Sub-Saharan Africa 82 66
Asia 71 56
Latin America and Caribbean 42 20
European Union (15) 13 4
Canada 8 2
United States 4 2
Japan 20 4
Developed Countries 18 7
Source: Computed using data from FAO database
Another reason the agricultural negotiations are important for Africa is that in the early stages of 
development the rural and agricultural sectors play a key role in economic development (Nurkse 1953; 
Rostow 1960). Th is role is particularly important in African economies characterized by low growth and 
a high incidence of poverty. Africa’s growth rate has been consistently low relative to the world as well as 
developing countries average. For example, over the period 1990-2001 the average annual growth rate of 
per capita GDP in Africa was 0.2 percent compared to 1.5 percent for the world, 1.3 percent for Latin 
America, and 3.1 percent for Asia (Cooper 2005). Poverty statistics also show that Africa’s performance 
is not as good as those of other developing countries (Table 4). Clearly, raising agricultural productivity 
and diversiﬁ cation into dynamic agricultural and manufactured exports are critical to the achievement of 
sustained growth and poverty reduction on the continent. Given the current factor endowments of the 
continent it is highly unlikely that the region would be able to diversify its economy into manufactured 
goods in the short run. Successful diversiﬁ cation of African economies requires upgrading of the 
8skills base through education and training and this takes time. Th erefore, in the short run, increasing 
agricultural productivity seems to be the most viable and promising approach to reducing poverty in the 
region. However, whether or not the continent can boost agricultural productivity in the future depends 
in part on the agricultural policy choices of African governments and the outcomes of the agriculture 
negotiations are likely to inﬂ uence these policy choices and decisions.
Table 4: Poverty in the world, 1950-2000 *
Region and Measure 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Head count ratio (percent)
East Asia 86.6 77.5 71.1 67.2 31.3 6.0
South Asia 44.3 37.2 32.1 34.4 18.5 7.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.3 53.2 52.2 49.9 55.3 54.8
Middle East and North Africa 26.3 24.3 13.4 4.3 5.2 7.8
Latin America 22.0 16.0 9.4 3.6 5.3 5.2
Eastern Europe 17.8 9.2 3.3 1.7 0. 0
Developing world 63.2 52.5 46.4 43.5 25.4 13.1
Number of poor people (millions)
East Asia 830 729 833 955 521 114
South Asia 208 209 229 310 207 105
Sub-Saharan Africa 104 118 150 188 278 362
Middle East and North Africa 27 32 23 10 16 29
Latin America 36 35 27 13 23 27
Eastern Europe 49 29 12 7 0 0
Developing world 1223 1131 1262 1479 1056 647
* Based on Poverty line (PPP, $1.50 a day).
Source: Cooper (2005).
Th e agriculture negotiations are also important for African countries because they tend to export 
primary commodities and current levels of protection in agriculture in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are quite high. Th erefore, there are potential gains 
from agricultural liberalization (Aksoy and Beghin 2005; Anderson et al 2005; Anderson and Martin 
2006). Clearly not all African countries are likely to gain from agricultural liberalization in OECD 
countries. In general, in the short run countries that are exporters of protected products are likely to 
gain and those that are importers are likely to lose from the potential increase in prices resulting from 
9liberalization. Table 5 presents the 2000-2004 average net trade positions of African countries in food and 
agricultural products. Given the region’s factor endowments and comparative advantages, it is striking 
to note that only 9 of the 53 countries in the region were net food exporters over the period 2000-2004. 
In addition, 18 of the 53 countries were net exporters of agricultural products. Th is stylized fact explains 
why some analysts and policymakers are worried that the withdrawal of OECD subsidies may lead to 
an increase in food prices and therefore undermine the food security of several countries in Africa. Th is 
is however not a good reason for not eliminating OECD subsidies. A country that is currently a net 
importer of food may become a net exporter after the elimination of subsidies if the removal of such 
barriers makes food production more attractive and hence boosts domestic production. In other words, 
production and export patterns depend on the current and future global trade policy environment and 
are likely to change as the environment changes. Consequently, although the withdrawal of subsidies 
arising from multilateral trade reforms may increase food prices and have negative short-term eﬀ ects 
on food importing countries, in the long run there is likely to be an adjustment that would reduce the 
vulnerability of some of these countries to such shocks. 
Table 5: Average net trade position of Africa for 2000-2004 
COUNTRY
Value of Net Exports (in thousand dollars)
Food (excluding fi sh)
1990-1995
Agricultural Products
Algeria -2687520 -3027900
Angola -479741 -669448
Benin -138064 -21410
Botswana -171683 -228212
Burkina Faso -60416 63879
Burundi -24018 848
Cameroon 26580 219451
Cape Verde -69222 -88706
Central African Republic -7543 -5324
Chad 7487 57739
Comoros -6323 -9300
Congo, Democratic Republic -235656 -235757
Congo, Republic -143520 -166249
Cote d’Ivoire 1709005 2118996
Djibouti -93199 -137405
Egypt -2014638 -2380043
Equatorial Guinea -10276 -25998
Eritrea -86192 -87409
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COUNTRY
Value of Net Exports (in thousand dollars)
Food (excluding fi sh)
1990-1995
Agricultural Products
Ethiopia -244596 -24659
Gabon -135034 -158300
Gambia -56265 -70989
Ghana 268019 170296
Guinea -117495 -139984
Guinea-Bissau 15869 10153
Kenya -108691 571859
Lesotho -81957 -97558
Liberia -74968 -10202
Libya -926698 -1127155
Madagascar 53348 55934
Malawi -3412 304460
Mali -6878 147428
Mauritania -173291 -238629
Mauritius 53312 11803
Morocco -653455 -930946
Mozambique -203259 -204842
Namibia -50587 -20914
Niger -52960 -74705
Nigeria -1276223 -1385695
Rwanda -53107 -25948
Sao Tome and Principe -5791 -10453
Senegal -440057 -450124
Seychelles -43994 -53872
Sierra Leone -112474 -133199
South Africa 695706 888718
Sudan -129645 -107864
Swaziland 112014 86704
Tanzania -114999 83111
Togo -25524 27731
Tunisia -242991 -412503
Uganda -115503 54097
Zambia -41699 7638
Zimbabwe -40341 599881
Source: Computed using data from FAO database
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IV. Key concerns of African countries in the Doha round
African countries are concerned that they are yet to realize the gains promised in the Uruguay Round. 
In the early 1990s there were several studies indicating that the potential gains from the Uruguay Round 
reforms are high. In particular, it was stressed that a large share of the global gains would accrue to 
developing countries. Safadi and Laird (1996) present and discuss some of the results of these studies. 
More recently, several studies have shown that Africa would incur losses as a result of the implementation 
of the Uruguay Round reforms (see Table 6).  For example, Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996), show 
that Sub-Saharan Africa would lose US$418 million from Uruguay Round reforms. Hertel, Masters 
and Elbehri (1998) also show that Africa is the only region of the world that is likely to lose from the 
implementation of Uruguay Round reforms.
Table 6: Gains and losses from Uruguay round reforms (1992 US$ billions)
Region
Base-model impacts on welfare gains 
and losses annually
Static IRTS model impacts on 
welfare gains and losses
Complete reform 
package
As % of GDP Complete reform 
package
As % of 
GDP
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.418 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
South Asia 3.286 1.0 3.7 1.1
Argentina 0.645 0.3 0.7 1.3
Brazil 1.310 0.3 1.4 0.4
Mexico 0.145 0 0.2 0
Rest of Latin America 1.198 0.4 1.3 0.5
Developing countries 17.651 0.4 19.4 0.4
Industrialized countries 75.208 0.4 76.6 0.4
World 92.859 0.4 96.0 0.4
Source: Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996).
Added to the unfair outcome of the Uruguay Round (UR) reforms is the growing realization that Africa 
may be vulnerable to partial reforms under the Doha round (see for example, Lippoldt and Kowalski 
2005; OECD 2005). Using a CGE model that incorporates preference erosion, variable employment 
and binding overhang, Achterbosch et al (2004) ﬁ nd that under full liberalization of global trade global 
gains are about 0.3 percent of GDP. For Sub-Saharan Africa the gains are also about 0.3 percent of GDP. 
However under modest reforms, as is likely under the Doha round, Sub-Saharan Africa incurs losses 
of about 2 percent of GDP while the global gains are 0.1 percent of GDP.  Apart from terms of trade 
eﬀ ects, the losses incurred by Sub-Saharan Africa under partial liberalization are due to the combined 
12
eﬀ ects of preference erosion and binding overhang. Several countries in the sub-region have preferential 
market access to key OECD markets and partial reforms increase the degree of competition they face 
from other developing countries in these export markets without oﬀ setting improvements in market 
access for African products in developing countries due to binding overhang. Bouet et al (2004) have 
also shown that recent results of applied general equilibrium model simulations are excessively optimistic 
in terms of projected welfare gains for developing countries. In particular, their results show that Sub-
Saharan Africa would lose from the types of partial agricultural trade liberalization likely to take place in 
the Doha round. Th ey attribute this to preference erosion. Given these vulnerabilities and the unrealized 
expectations from the UR, it is not surprising that African countries are wary about making further 
commitments in the Doha round. 
As in most developing countries, the rules and procedures of the multilateral trading system are regarded 
as unfair by African countries. Th ey view the rules and procedures as favouring the developed countries. 
For example, although the WTO is supposed to be a member-driven organization, important issues and 
decisions are taken in “Green Room” meetings and African countries do not have proportionate and 
adequate representation at these meetings. In addition, because of their relatively low bargaining power, 
countries in the region have diﬃ  culties setting and inﬂ uencing the agenda and pace of negotiations. 
Th e lop-sided power structure of the multilateral trading system is evident in the fact that developed 
countries managed to get the Singapore Issues on the agenda of the Doha Work Programme at the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha despite mounting opposition from developing countries---who 
comprise more than two-thirds of the membership of the WTO. Th e Singapore Issues contributed to the 
failure of the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun and three of the four issues were eventually 
taken out of the Doha Agenda.
Africa is also concerned about the incoherence between the trade and aid policies of OECD countries. 
On the one hand, they oﬀ er aid to African countries to help ﬁ ght poverty. On the other hand they adopt 
unfair agricultural support and trade policies that make it diﬃ  cult for the region to reap and maximize the 
beneﬁ ts of trade. Th e US support to cotton and the devastating eﬀ ect it has on African cotton producers-
--through depressed world prices---is a classic example of the harm done to African countries by unfair 
agricultural policies of OECD countries. Available empirical evidence suggests that the elimination of 
trade barriers facing Africa’s exports in the QUAD countries---the United States, the European Union, 
Japan and Canada---would result in a 14 percent increase in non-oil exports and a 1 percent increase in 
real income in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ianchovichina et al 2001). More importantly, the evidence suggests 
that the costs of the removal of these barriers to the QUAD countries would be insigniﬁ cant given Africa’s 
low share of international trade.
Th e lack of commitments and concrete mechanisms for ﬁ nding eﬀ ective solutions to the problem 
of preference erosion is also another major concern that African countries have in the Doha round 
negotiations. Several countries in the region participate in preferential trading schemes and are worried 
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that the Doha reforms may erode these preferences. It is often argued that trade preferences should not 
be encouraged because in several recipient countries the value is small. In addition, some analysts argue 
that they are inconsistent with the long-term interests of developing countries (Topp 2003). It is indeed 
true that the value of preferences is small for several countries in the region. However this is not a good 
reason for not taking the issue seriously in the negotiations because an eﬀ ective solution needs to be 
found for the limited number of countries in which the value of preferences is high if they are to support 
the reform eﬀ ort.  
Table 7:  Value of preferences under EU schemes (as % of exports to the EU)
Range Country
0 to 10 percent Sudan, Mali, Niger, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Central Africa Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, 
Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar, 
Comoros, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Greater than 10 but less than 30 percent Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Seychelles, Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, Senegal, Cape 
Verde, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania.
Greater than 30 percent Swaziland, Mauritius and Republic of Congo
Source: Compiled using data from Brenton and Ikezuki (2005)
Table 7 classiﬁ es African countries in terms of the value of preferences received in 2002 under the Cotonou 
and GSP schemes of the EU as a share of agricultural exports to the EU. It shows that there are at least 16 
countries in the sub-region for which the value of preferences received under EU schemes is more than 
10 percent of agricultural exports to the EU. For these countries preference erosion has real consequences 
(see for example, Lippoldt and Kowalski 2005). 
Another concern of African countries is the lack of capacity to analyze the implications of the various 
proposals made in the negotiations for their economies.  Th e international community has recognized 
this problem by setting up trade capacity building programmes for developing countries. However, it is 
becoming clear that these programmes suﬀ er from serious shortcomings that undermine their eﬀ ectiveness 
(Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006c). One of the problems with existing programmes is that they tend to be 
biased towards donor-driven priorities and economic interests. Th is is reﬂ ected in the fact that resources tend 
to be channelled to activities that further donor interests (UNDP 2005). For example, although developing 
countries were against launching negotiations on the Singapore Issues, 36 percent of the annual average 
spending on trade policy and regulation over the period 2001-2004 went to these issues (see Table 8). 
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Table 8: Assistance to trade policy and regulation  (US$ million)
Area Total for 2001-
2004 
Annual 
average
% of total
Singapore Issues
• Trade facilitation
• Trade and competition
• Trade and investment
• Transparency and govt. procurement
911
137
31
18
228
34
8.0
5.0
29.9
4.5
1.0
0.7
Agriculture 37 9.0 1.2
Trade mainstreaming 463 116 15.2
Technical Barriers to trade and SPS 376 94 12.3
Regional trade agreements 480 120 15.7
Accession 73 18 2.4
Dispute settlement 11 3.0 0.4
Trade-related intellectual property rights 48 12 1.6
Services 32 8.0 1.0
Non-agricultural market access 15 4.0 0.5
Rules 13 3.0 0.4
Training in trade negotiation techniques 31 8.0 1.0
Trade and environment 172 43 5.6
Trade education/training 203 51 6.7
Total 3052 763 100
Source: Computed using data from WTO-OECD (2005).
In contrast, training in trade negotiation techniques, which is necessary to increase the ability of 
developing countries to defend their interests in multilateral negotiations, accounted for about 1 percent. 
Furthermore, agriculture received only 1 percent even though it is deemed as the most important issue 
for developing countries in the Doha round. Added to this is the fact that the key capacity building 
programmes---the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme and the Integrated Framework---are 
generally under funded. Th ere is also weak support for local capacity building as donors frequently favour 
their consultants over professionals in recipient countries (Deere 2005; Aryeetey et al 2003). 
Th ere is also the concern that the Doha round reforms will lead to de-industrialization in the region and 
force African countries to specialize more in commodities. Is this fear justiﬁ ed? Achterbosch et al (2004) 
examined this issue and found that as a result of the reforms Africa would specialize more in cereals, 
sugar, and cotton and this is driven mostly by policy changes towards these programme commodities in 
OECD countries. In addition there would be less specialization in commodities such as vegetables, fruits, 
and ﬂ owers, and a contraction of activities in light and heavy industries. 
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Figure 1: Changes in specialization for Africa and EU-15 after reforms*
North Africa Sub-Sahara Africa Southern Africa EU-15
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
13 Services
12 Trade
11 Industry
10 Light
9 Extract
8 proFOOD
7 Animal
6 oCrops
5 Cotton
4 Sugar
3 Oilseeds
2 Vegetable
1 Cereals
* Th e ﬁ gure shows the changes to the specialization index in percentage points.
Figure 1 shows the changes in specialization patterns in the model for Africa and the EU-15 when 
moving from modest to full reform. Although these changes in specialization patterns are dictated by 
current comparative advantage they are worrisome because commodity prices are highly volatile and 
volatility has consequences for macroeconomic performance (Bleaney and Greenaway 2001).
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V. What Africa wants from the agriculture negotiations
Th e positions and demands of African countries on various issues under the Doha Development Agenda 
are contained in a series of declarations made by African countries after the launching of the Doha Round 
in November 2001. Th ese include:
• Th e Grand Baie Declaration issued at the conference of the African Union’s Ministers of Trade held 
in Grand Baie, Mauritius, from 19-20 June 2003;
• Th e Kigali Consensus issued at the conference of the African Union’s Ministers of Trade held in 
Kigali, Rwanda, from 27-28 May 2004;
• Th e Cairo Declaration issued at the conference of the African Union’s Ministers of Trade held in 
Cairo, Egypt, from 5-9 June 2005; and
• Th e Arusha Development Benchmarks issued at the conference of the African Union’s Ministers of 
Trade held in Arusha, Tanzania, from 22-24 November 2005.
In this section I assess the extent to which the outcome of the agricultural negotiations, as reﬂ ected in 
the draft declaration issued at the end of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, meets the demands 
and requests of African countries. Since the Arusha Benchmarks contain the main positions of African 
countries in the run-up to the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong the assessment will focus on 
this document. Table 9 presents Africa’s demands on agriculture relative to the agreement in the Hong 
Kong draft ministerial declaration. 
One of the important decisions made at the Hong Kong meeting was to set an end date for the elimination 
of export subsidies. Trade Ministers agreed that all forms of export subsidies will be eliminated by the end 
of 2013. African countries as well as most WTO Members wanted these subsidies eliminated by 2010. 
However, the EU was unwilling to commit to this deadline and in an attempt to avoid a repeat of the 
experience in Cancun, Members agreed to the date preferred by the EU.  Th e EU has a preference for the 
2013 deadline because under the 2003 reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) it is expected 
to eliminate most export subsidies by 2013. Concerns were expressed by several developing countries 
that the new deadline would allow the EU to delay cuts in subsidies until the last moment. To address 
this concern the draft declaration includes language that the elimination of subsidies “will be achieved 
in a progressive and parallel manner so that a substantial part is realized by the end of the ﬁ rst half of 
the implementation period.” Although African countries were not happy with the new deadline they 
welcomed the fact that an end date has been set. 
Food aid is another aspect of export competition where Africa’s demands were addressed. In prescribing 
disciplines on food aid the draft declaration makes provision for the establishment of a Safe Box to ensure 
that there is no disruption of emergency food aid. Th e other demands made by African countries were not 
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really addressed in the declaration. For example, they called for State Trading Enterprises in Africa to be 
exempted from disciplines on export competition but there was no commitment on this in the declaration. 
On the domestic support pillar of the agriculture negotiations, there are two commitments in favour 
of African countries. Th e ﬁ rst is the idea that the criteria for the Green Box will be reviewed to ensure 
that developing country Members that cause not more than minimal trade-distortion are eﬀ ectively 
covered. Th e second is the provision that developing country Members with no Aggregate Measurement 
of Support (AMS) commitments will be exempt from reductions in de minimis and the overall cut in 
trade-distorting domestic support. Th e other demands of African countries under this pillar were not 
really addressed in the declaration.
With regard to market access pillar, it was agreed that there will be four bands but it is not yet clear what 
the relevant thresholds will be for developed and developing countries. Th e draft declaration addressed 
two key demands of African countries in this pillar. Th e ﬁ rst is that it gives ﬂ exibility to developing 
countries to self-designate an appropriate number of tariﬀ  lines as Special Products that are exempt from 
reduction commitments. Th ese are to be guided by indicators based on the criteria of food security, 
livelihood security, and rural development. Th e second is that the declaration gives developing countries 
the right to have recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) based on import and price triggers to 
protect farmers from import surges. On the other demands of African countries under this pillar, there 
was no signiﬁ cant progress.
African countries were really disappointed and frustrated with the outcome of the negotiations on Cotton 
as reﬂ ected in the draft declaration. Given the political signiﬁ cance of this issue and the role it played in 
the collapse of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, African countries expected the United 
States to make serious eﬀ orts to address the concerns of the cotton producing and exporting countries in 
the region. African countries called for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies on cotton by the 
end of December 2005. Th is request was not honoured in the draft declaration although there was an 
agreement that the subsidies will be eliminated in 2006. On market access, the declaration also responded 
to the request by African countries. Th ere was the commitment that developed countries will give duty 
and quota free access for cotton exports from LDCs from the commencement of the implementation 
period. On domestic support---which is the most important pillar of the cotton issue---there was no 
speciﬁ c or real commitment in the declaration except the understanding by Members that reduction of 
barriers in this area will be more ambitious and the implementation period shorter than for agriculture. 
African countries were disappointed with this aspect of the declaration because domestic subsidies on 
cotton make up more than two-thirds of the US support on cotton and the draft declaration did not 
impose any serious discipline in this area.  In the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, 
African countries made a proposal with speciﬁ c time-frame on reduction of domestic support on cotton. 
Th ey asked for support to be reduced by 80 percent by 31 December 2006; 10 percent by 1 January 
2008; and 10 percent by 1 January 2009. In Hong Kong African countries made changes to the proposal 
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to increase the likelihood of an agreement in this area. Under the revised proposal, 60 percent of the 
trade-distorting domestic support on cotton will be eliminated by 2008; 20 percent by 2009; and 20 
percent by 2010.  However, this compromise on the part of African countries did not change the position 
of the US on the issue.
Another aspect of the cotton negotiation where there was not much progress is the issue of compensation. 
African countries had asked for the setting up of an Emergency Fund to help cotton exporters deal 
with the declines in revenue resulting from depressed cotton prices. Th e draft declaration contains no 
new commitment in this area but urged the Director General of the WTO to explore the possibility of 
establishing a mechanism to deal with income declines in the cotton sector.
Table 9: Africa’s demands and the outcomes of the Hong Kong meeting
Issue Africa’s Positions and Demands in 
Agriculture
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
Export 
Competition
Elimination of all forms of export subsidies on 
agricultural products by 2010
Parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 
the end of 2013
Disciplines on food aid must take into account 
the interests of food aid recipients
Interests of food aid recipients to be taken into 
account. A Safe Box for bona fi de food aid will be 
provided.
Immediate implementation of the Marrakech 
decision on Net Food Importing Developing 
Countries (NFIDCs) and LDCs, in accordance 
with paragraph 4 of the decision.
Disciplines on export measures will incorporate 
appropriate provision in favour of LDCs and NFIDCs as 
provided for in paragraph 4 of the Marrakech decision.
State Trading Enterprises (STEs) in Africa 
should be exempted from disciplines on export 
competition.
Disciplines on exporting STEs will extend to the future 
use of monopoly powers. However, there will be 
provision in favour of LDCs and NFIDCs as provided 
for in paragraph 4 of the Marrakech decision.
Domestic 
Support
Review of the Green Box criteria to provide 
policy space for developing countries
The Green Box criteria will be reviewed in line with 
paragraph 16 of the July Framework to ensure that 
developing country Members that cause not more 
than minimal trade-distortion are effectively covered.
Review and tighten the Green Box criteria for 
developed countries to ensure that it is non or 
minimally trade distorting. 
No specifi c statement on this in the declaration
Tightening of the criteria for the Blue Box and the 
inclusion of disciplines to prevent box shifting
No specifi c statement on these in the declaration. 
However, it is stated that cuts to overall trade-distorting 
support must be at least equal to the sum of reductions 
in Amber Box, Blue Box, and de minimis support.
Exemption of African countries from de minimis  
and AMS reduction commitments
Developing country Members with no AMS 
commitments will be exempt from reductions in 
de minimis and the overall cut in trade-distorting 
domestic support.
Allowing African countries policy space for the 
development of farming communities
No specifi c statement on this in the declaration
Need for real reductions in trade distorting 
domestic support
Disciplines will be developed to achieve effective cuts 
in trade-distorting domestic support consistent with 
the July Framework
19
Market Access Application of the principle of proportionality in 
the reduction of tariffs and the need to take into 
account the differences in tariff structures across 
Members
No specifi c statement on this in the declaration. 
Provision of policy space to allow African 
countries pursue agricultural policies that are 
supportive of their development goals.
No specifi c statement on this in the declaration
An improvement in market access for products 
of export interest to African countries with special 
attention given to tariff escalation, tariff peaks 
and non-tariff barriers.
No specifi c statement on this in the declaration
Treatment of Special Products must provide 
fl exibility for African countries and refl ect 
domestic circumstances and development 
needs.
Developing country Members will have fl exibility to 
self-designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as 
Special Products guided by indicators based on the 
criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural 
development.
Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM) must be 
operationally effective to address the specifi c 
circumstances of African countries
Developing country Members will have right to have 
recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism based 
on import quantity and price triggers
Concrete mechanisms and solutions to the 
problems of preference erosion.
No new provisions were made on this issue in the 
declaration.
Cotton Total elimination of export subsidies on cotton by 
31 December 2005.
All forms of export subsidies for cotton will be 
eliminated by developed countries in 2006
Reduction of domestic support on Cotton under 
the following time frame: 
• 80% by 31 December 2006
• 10% by 1 January 2008
• 10% by 1 January 2009
Trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton 
production should be reduced more ambitiously than 
under whatever general formula is agreed and should 
be implemented over a shorter period of time than 
generally applicable to agriculture
Setting up of an Emergency Fund to address 
cotton revenue defi cits resulting from depression 
of world cotton prices.
Director General of the WTO urged to intensify 
his consultative efforts with bilateral donors as 
well as multilateral and regional institutions on the 
development assistance aspects of cotton. He is also 
to explore the possibility of establishing a mechanism 
to deal with income declines in the cotton sector.
Mobilization of technical and fi nancial assistance 
to aid cotton exporters to add value to their 
products.
Urged the development community to further scale 
up its cotton-specifi c assistance and to support the 
efforts of the WTO Director General in this area.
Provision of duty and quota free access for 
cotton and its by-products for the LDC cotton 
producers and net exporters.
Developed countries will give duty and quota free 
access for cotton exports from LDCs from the 
commencement of the implementation period
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VI. Ensuring a fair outcome for Africa in the agriculture 
negotiations
Given the crises that have marked WTO Ministerial conferences since Seattle, it is clear that a successful 
completion of the agriculture negotiations and the Doha Round will depend largely on the extent to 
which there are tangible beneﬁ ts for developing countries in any proposed deals. It is therefore important 
that the key players in the negotiation process---the EU and the US---bear this in mind and also take 
bold steps to ensure that this is indeed the case. Failure to ensure that there are tangible beneﬁ ts for 
developing countries in the negotiations, will conﬁ rm the widely held view that developed countries 
preach free trade only when it suits their interests. It will also weaken the intellectual arguments or case 
for free trade and increase the alienation of developing countries from the global trading system with 
grave consequences for poverty and world security. Th erefore, there is the urgent need to address the 
concerns of developing countries in the negotiations. In this regard, the following elements are necessary 
in any agreement to ensure a fair outcome for Africa in the agriculture negotiations.
• Quick resolution of the cotton issue;
• Granting duty and quota free access to OECD countries for all products emanating from the 
LDCs;
• Elimination of tariﬀ  peaks, tariﬀ  escalation and non-tariﬀ  barriers limiting Africa’s incentives and 
ability to export processed agricultural products;
• Granting ﬂ exibility or policy space to African countries to deal eﬀ ectively with poverty reduction, 
food security, and rural development needs;
• Finding concrete mechanisms and solutions to the problem of preference erosion; 
• More meaningful and eﬀ ective trade capacity building programmes; and
• Binding commitments on provision of ﬁ nancial assistance to help developing countries cushion the 
burden and short-term costs of adjustment to trade reforms.
Th ese elements, whilst modest, would address some of the concerns of African countries in the 
negotiations, increase their conﬁ dence in the multilateral trading system and ensure that the continent 
is not left out in the globalization process. In this regard, it is important that in the modalities phase of 
the Doha negotiations developed countries show leadership and make more meaningful commitments 
that would create an opportunity for African countries to derive more gains from the multilateral trading 
system. Th at said, the responsibility to make trade work for Africa does not rest only with developed 
countries. African countries also have a vital role to play because the beneﬁ ts of trade are not automatic. 
Th ey accrue to countries that have taken steps to exploit them. Th erefore, African countries should 
adopt complimentary domestic policies that would enable them to take advantage of the potential 
trading opportunities that could arise from the Doha round reforms. Th is requires lifting supply-side 
constraints, reducing transactions costs, putting in place domestic policies that would create an incentive 
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for production of dynamic export products, and intensifying regional integration eﬀ orts in areas such as 
infrastructure, education, governance, and conﬂ ict prevention and resolution. 
Concluding remarks
Several promises were made to developing countries at the launch of the Fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in 2001. Th ese include: improving market access for agricultural goods of developing 
countries as well as the reduction of export subsidies and other domestic support measures used by 
developed countries; dealing with tariﬀ  peaks, tariﬀ  escalation, and non-tariﬀ  barriers to products of 
export interest to developing countries; reviewing all Special and Diﬀ erential Treatment (S&D) provisions 
to make them more eﬀ ective and allow developing countries to take care of food security and rural 
development needs; putting in place better and balanced rules to protect developing countries rights and 
interests in the trading system; providing more technical assistance and capacity building programmes to 
developing countries; and ﬁ nding appropriate solutions to implementation concerns as well as addressing 
outstanding issues as a matter of priority. 
Translating these promises into binding commitments continues to pose serious challenges for both 
developed and developing countries. For the developed countries the challenge is how to fulﬁ ll these 
Doha promises without undermining the trade liberalization objectives of the WTO. For developing 
countries, however, the key challenge is how to participate in the Doha reforms without jeopardizing 
important national development goals. 
Responding to this challenge would require vigilance on the part of African countries. It would also 
require a strategic approach to trade and a clear assessment of the beneﬁ ts and costs of multilateral 
trade negotiations to the region. Th is is particularly important given the enormous human and ﬁ nancial 
resources currently expended on trade negotiations by several countries in the region. It is also important 
because recent studies suggest that under the most optimistic scenario the gains to Africa from multilateral 
trade reforms are likely to be about 1-2 percent of GDP and this is far below what is need to enable the 
region meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example, Sachs et al (2004) show that 
African countries would require aid ﬂ ows equivalent to 20-30 percent of their GDP over the course of 
a decade in order to ﬁ nance the public investments needed to meet the MDGs. In addition, the report 
of the Millennium Project suggests that a typical low income country with an average per capita income 
of $300 in 2005 would require external ﬁ nancing of about 10-20 percent of GNP to meet the MDGs 
(United Nations 2005). Consequently, it is very important that eﬀ orts at liberalization by countries in 
the region do not put poverty reduction and other national development goals at risk.
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Appendix:  Taxes on international trade and transactions (% of revenue)
Country Period
1985-1994 2000-2003
Angola 4.2 4.8
Benin 59.2 47.5
Botswana 13.3 --
Burkina Faso 42.7 16.4
Burundi 25.6 21.3
Cameroon 17.0 12.9
Cape Verde 43.5 39.8
Central African Republic 35.5 36.8
Chad 20.8 23.6
Comoros 38.9 56.6
Congo, Dem Republic of -- 36
Congo, Republic of 11.0 7
Cote d’Ivoire 31.9 35.7
Djibouti 22.1 38.1
Equatorial Guinea 26.9 3.1
Eritrea 45.6 39.7
Ethiopia 19.6 30.1
Gabon 19.4 21.4
Gambia, The 50.1 51.9
Ghana 29.7 21.9
Guinea 9.9 18.8
Guinea-Bissau 9.1 36.2
Kenya 8.8 28
Lesotho 51.5 46.6
Liberia -- --
Madagascar 39.2 48.1
Malawi 19.4 11.2
Mali 33.7 44.6
Mauritania 34.3 9.2
Mauritius 49.8 25.8
Mozambique 18.2 15.8
Namibia 32.0 30.1
Niger 37.0 50.2
Nigeria -- 8.2
Rwanda 37.8 17
Sao Tomé and Principe 15.8 36.7
Senegal 27.0 16.5
Seychelles 44.9 23.6
Sierra Leone 42.7 42.6
Somalia -- --
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Country Period
1985-1994 2000-2003
South Africa 4.1 3.4
Sudan 14.6 19.6
Swaziland -- --
Tanzania 18.7 36
Togo 36.2 41.9
Uganda 54.4 40.2
Zambia 31.5 30.2
Zimbabwe -- 9.6
Source: Computed using data from African Development Indicators 2005.
27
Other documents published by ATPC
No.1 Les processus de création du marche commun africain: une vue d’ensemble
No. 2 Cancún and Post-Cancún Brieﬁ ng Papers on Africa and the Doha Development Agenda:  Th e Current State of Play in 
the Negotiations
No. 3 Trade Liberalization under the Doha Development Agenda: Options and Consequences for Africa
No. 4 Trade Facilitation to Integrate Africa into the World Economy
No. 5 Fiscal Implications of Trade Liberalization on African Countries
No. 6 Trade Liberalization and Development: Lessons for Africa
No. 7 Libéralisation commerciale et développement: Quelles leçons pour l’Afrique?
No. 8 Exclure l’Afrique des marches? Evaluation de l’accès aux marches pour les pays africains
No. 9 Economic and Statistical Analyses of Trade Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa
No. 10 Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements
No. 11 Unrestricted Market Access for sub-Saharan Africa: Important Beneﬁ ts with Little Cost to the QUAD
No. 12 Trade Preferences and Africa: Th e State of Play and the Issues at Stake
No. 13 Assessing the Consequences of the Economic Partnership Agreement on the Rwandan Economy
No. 14 Doha Round entre promesses, désillusions et résignations
No. 15 Évaluation de l’impact de l’Accord de partenariat économique entre les pays de la CEMAC et l’Union européenne
No. 16 Peut-on mettre la globalisation au service du développement?
No. 17 Comment sauver le textile maghrébin?
No. 18 Le cycle de Doha peut-il bénéﬁ cier à l’industrie africaine?
No. 19 Facilitation du commerce intra-africain: Démanteler les barrières pour le commerce intra-africain
No. 20 Pourquoi l’Afrique s’est-elle marginalisée dans le commerce international?
No. 21 Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance,Challenges and Responsibilities
No. 22 Eﬀ ets des accords de partenariat économique entre l’UE et l’Afrique
sur l’économie et le bien-être
No. 23 Evaluation de l’impact de l’accord de partenariat économique entre les pays de la COMESA et l’Union européenne
No. 24 Evaluation de l’Accord de Partenariat Economique entre l’Union européenne et le Mali
No. 25 Non-Tariﬀ  Barriers – Th eir Prevalence and Relevance for African Countries
No. 26 L’Acces aux marches  peut-il aider l’agriculture africaine?
No. 27 L’Afrique et les préférences commerciales – Etat des lieux et enjeux
No. 28 Th e EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: A Regional Perspective
No. 29 Evaluation de l’impact de l’accord de partenariat économique entre les pays de la CEDEAO et l’Union européenne 
(also available in English)
No. 30 Progress Report on Regional Integration Eﬀ orts in Africa towards the Promotion of Intra-african Trade
No. 31 Trade Regimes, Liberalization and Macroeconomic Instability in Africa
No. 32 Emerging Issues and Concerns of African Countries in the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture 
and the Doha Round
